Offenses Included in Other Crimes. Derivative Responsibility for Crimes. Working with a Criminal Lawyer. Find a Criminal Law Lawyer. Justia Legal Resources. Agent Peter Burke seemingly pulls some strings to get Neal his consulting sentence back, and Neal agrees to it once more, but with a different agenda—he was going to find and get his revenge on Fowler, who he believes blew up the plane to kill him and Kate.
He finds out that Fowler had gone underground, and in order to lure him out, Neal contacts Alex Hunter once again. Alex, however, does not want to help because someone is after her—the same someone who had been after Neal for the music box. Their plan to steal the music box becomes two-fold: to get Fowler out in the open, and to get the target off of Alex's back. The plan proves successful, but Neal is unable to extract revenge on Fowler because of Peter Burke's intervention. He is later grateful for Peter's actions when they find out that Fowler hadn't been the one to 'pull the trigger.
It is later revealed to Neal that the man who killed Kate and was after the music box was Neal's former employer, Vincent Adler, who turns out to be the son of a Nazi soldier involved in hiding a U-boat full of Nazi treasure. To a similar effect, Alex Hunter admits that she is the granddaughter of Gerhard Wagner , who had been the U-boat's radio operator.
Wagner created a mathematical equation—called a fractal —that was meant to lead him back to the sunken U-boat. He placed it inside the music box, which was the reason why both Adler and Alex were after it. Neal and Peter eventually find the treasure, after which Adler has them escorted out of the ship and brought to a drydock. With orders to flood the drydock, Adler's men leave Neal, Peter and Alex there to drown.
However, Alex reveals that she has a knife in her bra, and Neal uses it to free himself and his companions. Later, they are able to find Adler, who admits to Neal that he killed Kate just as the warehouse full of the U-boat treasure explodes. Enraged, Adler blames Neal for blowing up the treasure and aims a gun at him, but Peter arrives in time and shoots him first, killing Adler and saving Neal. When Neal arrives back at his apartment, he finds a key and an address, in which he discovers that the supposedly blown-up treasure.
Mozzie had apparently swapped the treasure for the items in Neal's art studio, allowing Adler and the FBI to believe that the treasure was destroyed. Mozzie is excited and begins to make plans for him and Neal to leave New York, though Neal is reluctant to leave because of his friends and Sara, who he is dating. Eventually, Neal realizes that Peter suspects him of stealing the U-boat treasure, and discovers that a piece of the burned art had been salvaged.
He replaces the burnt piece with a new one that he makes out of the colors from one of the older paintings from the treasure to convince Peter that the piece of burnt art was part of the destroyed treasure. For a while, this placates Peter, until Neal hears about the manifest Diana has apparently found in the wreckage, meaning that if any of the treasures on the manifest surface, Peter will know for sure that the treasure didn't burn.
Mozzie wants proof of the manifest, so Neal breaks into Peter's house while Peter and his wife Elizabeth are out. However, Neal realizes that if he tells Mozzie that the manifest is real, they can sell whatever wasn't included on the list and flee the country, making New York a distant memory. It would also mean that Neal could no longer return to NYC. Reluctant to leave, Neal lies to Mozzie and tells him that the manifest didn't exist.
Matthew Keller , a long-time rival of Neal's with dubious ethics, later appears, believing that Neal had the treasure. This is the exact amount of a Degas painting Mozzie has been wanting to fence, but is on the manifest. Neal is then forced to admit to Mozzie that the manifest exists, which makes Mozzie angry at Neal for lying to him. After retrieving the fenced Degas and replacing it with a forgery, Mozzie declares that his partnership with Neal is over. Soon after, Neal discovers that in order to force him to give Keller the treasure, Keller has kidnapped Elizabeth and revealed to Peter that Neal did have possession of the missing treasure and had willingly hidden it from him.
Enraged, Peter angrily confronts Neal, who earnestly tells Peter that he would give everything if it meant getting Elizabeth back. Mollified, Peter goes with Neal to the warehouse, but finds that Mozzie—in his anger at Neal—had moved everything. Desperately, Neal goes to contact Mozzie and tell him that Elizabeth had been kidnapped.
Mozzie returns to help save her, and Keller is then caught and sent to prison. Neal's relationship with Peter and Mozzie eventually heals and strengthens, and when Peter's mentor Agent Kramer comes to sabotage Neal's communal hearing, Peter attempts to thwart it.
However, Kramer finds evidence of Neal's theft of a Raphael painting, which turns out to be stored at Ellen Parker's home in Roosevelt Island.
Peter helps cover for him and enlists Sara's help, where she tells Kramer that Neal helped her recover the painting and had been in processing for a few weeks now. Unsatisfied, Kramer later returns with US Marshals to arrest Neal under bogus charges of public endangerment, at which Peter gives Neal the signal to skip town. Neal then returns to his apartment in June's townhouse, cuts his anklet, and hops on a plane with Mozzie. There, he meets and dates a cafe owner named Maya , and is later introduced to a resident bigshot named Dobbs.
However, he is later contacted by Peter and warned that an agent with dubious morals was coming after him. Peter tracks Neal down, whereupon the agent, Collins , finds the information and heads to Cape Verde. Peter follows and helps Neal escape, were they discover that Dobbs is actually an alias. Upon returning to New York, Neal attempts to get to know more about his father through Ellen , who had been his father 's partner.
Ellen makes contact with Sam , who continued the investigation after Ellen was placed into WitSec , and asks him to work with Neal on the case. Ellen, however, dies before she can mediate a meeting between Sam and Neal, forcing Neal to chase down Sam.
Peter calls Neal with the results of the blood test and learns that "Sam" is his father, James Bennett. Neal then takes up the role of a security guard during the heist, in order to allow the Pink Panthers into the airport.
Confidential Informant Coordinators also work with confidential file room analysts in managing the special recordkeeping and document management requirements of the Criminal Informant Program, troubleshoot problems, and assist in the training and administrative aspects of informant operations.
Attorneys' Offices for their perspectives on compliance-related aspects of the Confidential Informant Guidelines. Overall, we found one or more Guidelines deficiencies in of the confidential informant files, or 87 percent of those we examined. The deficiencies included failure to document the agent's evaluation of one or more suitability factors in the initial or continuing suitability evaluations, failure to give the required instructions to CIs or to do so at the required intervals, failure to obtain proper authority to permit CIs to engage in otherwise illegal activities, issuance of retroactive approvals of otherwise illegal activities, failure to report unauthorized illegal activity in accordance with the Guidelines, and failure to document deactivation of CIs.
The following table summarizes our compliance findings by category. TABLE 3. We set forth below our findings for each of the five compliance categories we tested in our review of individual confidential informant files.
Attorneys' Offices, we separately address compliance findings relating to those exchanges. Initial and Continuing Suitability Reviews. As we discussed above, suitability reviews are the initial and periodic reviews undertaken by FBI Special Agents and their supervisors to evaluate the suitability of those whom they propose to operate or to continue operating as confidential informants.
In one form or another, suitability reviews have been required for all confidential informants since the first set of Attorney General Guidelines issued in Since January , Special Agents proposing to designate a source of information as a confidential informant have been required to research at least 17 different factors which, collectively, will inform the initial suitability determination. Prospective confidential informants are initially placed in Suitability Inquiry Status SIS for up to days, during which these factors are researched and evaluated by the Special Agent who is proposing to "run" or operate the confidential informant.
If the case agent proposes, and the field manager approves, the suitability of an individual to serve as a confidential informant, the informant is "registered" as a confidential informant, at which point certain identifying and other information is placed in the informant's file. A of the CI Guidelines address several concerns, including whether the CI's information can be corroborated and is relevant to an investigation's objectives. If the informant's information cannot be corroborated, it is likely to be insufficient for critical purposes e.
Texas, U. Gates, U. Agents must also address the nature of the CI's relationship to the subject or target of the investigation. This is another means by which to assess the potential relevance of the confidential informant's information and also flag potential negative suitability issues. The confidential informant presumably will have valuable information about an important target but is not committing crimes nearly as serious as the target's.
If the situation is the reverse, however, it may not be a productive arrangement for the government. For example, confidential informants Bulger and Flemmi were mob bosses who were providing information about lower-level criminals and crimes while using law enforcement to serve their criminal purposes and preserving the possibility of an informant defense if prosecuted themselves for murder and other serious crimes.
Case agents must address all of the applicable factors required for the initial suitability determination and, in addition, indicate the length of time the individual has been registered as a confidential informant and the length of time the individual has been handled by the same agent or agents. Our surveys of Informant Coordinators also revealed concerns about agents' compliance with the suitability assessment requirements.
With regard to the critical initial evaluation of CIs' suitability, 27 percent of the Coordinators said they believe that insufficiently rigorous suitability determinations are an occasional concern in their respective field offices, and 43 percent said they believe that agents' failure to devote adequate time to complete the paperwork associated with confidential informants is an occasional concern.
As described earlier, when a confidential informant is registered, the case agent must review with the CI, in the presence of another agent, written instructions or admonishments detailing the constraints under which the CI is to operate.
The Guidelines require that the content and meaning of the instructions must be clearly conveyed, but as of May , they no longer require that the instructions be read verbatim. After the instructions are given, the case agent must obtain the CI's acknowledgement of the CI's receipt and understanding of the instructions and must document that the instructions were reviewed with the CI and that the CI acknowledged his or her understanding of them. The CI files we reviewed all involved informants who were supposed to be instructed by the assigned case agents at registration, annually, or both.
Of those CI files, we found that: 93 of the files, or 78 percent, contained documentation that all required instructions were given and acknowledged; all but 1 file contained documentation that the required instructions were given at registration; 22 of the files, or 18 percent, did not contain documentation of 1 required annual instruction; 3 of the files, or 3 percent, did not contain documentation of 2 required annual instructions; 1 file did not contain documentation of 3 annual instructions; and 33 of the files, or 28 percent, contained documentation indicating that the instructions were given, but were not timely; on average, the instructions were given 72 days late, and ranged from 4 to days late.
The following table illustrates the significant disparity in the number of days the FBI was late in providing the required instructions, either upon registration of the CI or in giving the annual instructions.
Our findings that all required instructions were not given in a substantial percentage of the sampled CI files were corroborated by the survey responses from Confidential Informant Coordinators. As reflected in the following diagram, Informant Coordinators told us that they believed case agents in their field offices are communicating the required instructions and are delivering them in the presence of another law enforcement officer in all cases less than two-thirds of the time.
Informant Coordinators further reported that adherence to the requirement that instructions be repeated every 12 months is even lower. As the following diagram illustrates, only 32 percent of Informant Coordinators said the annual instructions are given in all cases, and 66 percent stated they are given in a majority of cases.
As described earlier in this chapter, under some circumstances the Confidential Informant Guidelines permit confidential informants to engage in otherwise illegal activity OIA. Attorney in advance and in writing. The authorization is effective for a period not to exceed 90 days. The official said that Tier 2 OIA typically involves similar activities to Tier 1 OIA but drug amounts below the sentencing guidelines thresholds and with no significant risk of violence.
We surveyed Confidential Informant Coordinators to see if they believed case agents in their field offices were complying with the Guidelines' requirement to obtain the informant's written acknowledgement of instructions relating to authority to engage in otherwise illegal activity. We found that 15 of the 25 files, or 60 percent, reflected compliance deficiencies. The deficiencies included OIA authorizations for sources who had not yet been registered as CIs, retroactive authorizations of OIA, authorizations of Tier 2 OIA that should have been denominated as Tier 1 and therefore required DOJ approval, insufficiently specific descriptions of OIA, failures to obtain the CI's written acknowledgment of instructions regarding the limits of OIA activities, and failures to provide required instructions.
Four of the 25 files, or 16 percent, indicate that sources were authorized by field supervisors to engage in Tier 2 OIA from 45 to days before the source was approved for conversion to a fully operational confidential informant. Although these four files do not indicate when the OIA was actually performed, we consider this to be a Guidelines violation since the period during which the CI was authorized to engage in OIA preceded the period for which the CI was eligible to engage in OIA under the Guidelines.
Five of the 25 files that contained OIA authorization, or 20 percent, indicate that the field supervisors retroactively authorized confidential informants to engage in Tier 2 OIA anywhere from 17 to 63 days after the start of the authorization period.
In these cases, field supervisors authorized the OIA retroactively to the first day of the day authorization period. The OIA in these cases included engaging in conspiratorial conversations in connection with a domestic terrorism investigation, engaging in telephone conversations and face-to-face meetings with targeted subjects of a drug trafficking investigation, and purchasing drug paraphernalia as a drug broker.
We could not determine from our limited file reviews the reason why the case agents sought OIA authority for the earlier period, whether the CIs in fact engaged in OIA prior to the retroactive authorization, or whether the field supervisors were aware of either the specific criminal activities that were retroactively authorized or the reason for the agents' delay in seeking approval.
We also identified two instances in which the FBI failed to obtain proper authorization from the U. Attorney with respect to Tier 1 OIA. Both matters originated in the same field office, and the OIA in question was treated as Tier 2. In the second case, the risk of violence justified the Tier 1 status.
The files for 7 of the 25 CI files 28 percent that contained OIA authorizations did not include sufficiently specific descriptions of the authorized OIA in that they failed to specify the time period or "specific conduct" authorized.
The following table illustrates our findings regarding premature, retroactive, and insufficiently specific authorizations, and authorizations of persons for whom the FBI had no basis to authorize OIA. The FBI is required to notify either a U. Attorney or the head of a DOJ litigating component when a CI engages in illegal activity which was not previously authorized, known as unauthorized illegal activity or "UIA.
The Confidential Informant Guidelines require that notice of the unauthorized illegal activity be provided by the Special Agent in Charge of the field office operating the CI to the U. Attorneys' Offices or DOJ personnel. The FBI is not required to provide such notice when a state or local prosecuting office has filed charges against the informant for the illegal conduct, there is no clear basis for federal prosecution, and federal prosecutors have not previously authorized the CI to engage in Tier 1 OIA or been involved in an investigation that is utilizing the CI.
Of the informant files we examined during our review, we identified 12 instances, or 10 percent, where the CI engaged in unauthorized illegal activity. Attorney in 3 of the 12 cases. In 4 of the 12 cases, the CI case files did not include sufficient information for us to determine whether charges had been filed by state or local prosecutors following arrest of the CI, and thus it was not possible to determine whether the Guidelines' notification requirement was triggered.
Our review also found that neither the field nor FBI Headquarters typically monitors whether charges are filed by state or local prosecutors following a CI's arrest. We identified one field office that did not have any forms to record the occurrence of unauthorized illegal activity. Attorney's Office. In two of the five cases, the FBI failed to provide any notification to the U.
Attorney's Office, in violation of the CI Guidelines. The UIA in these cases were a state arrest relating to purchasing heroin and a misdemeanor charge of manufacturing unauthorized records.
The other three files contained documentation indicating that notice was provided to the U. Attorney as required by the Guidelines. Deactivation of Confidential Informants. In our review of 46 informant files indicating that the informant had been deactivated, we found: 17 of the 46 files, or 37 percent, contained 1 or more deficiencies; there was no documentation in 15 of the 46 files 33 percent indicating that the CI was notified of the deactivation; in one CI file, there was no documentation that the field office coordinated with the Assistant U.
Attorney assigned to the matter regarding the deactivation; and one CI file had no documentation of the deactivation itself. As we discussed in Chapter Two, the significant revisions made to the Confidential Informant Guidelines in January changed the role of the U. Attorneys' Offices with respect to the approval and management of confidential informants.
Attorneys' Offices throughout the country. Ninety-one Criminal Division Chiefs or their designees responded to our survey in February The results show that the Criminal Division Chiefs are overwhelmingly satisfied with the FBI's communication with them regarding confidential informants.
The survey results included the following: with respect to the FBI's obligation to obtain the U. Attorney's advance written approval of Tier 1 OIA, the Criminal Division Chiefs said they were not aware of any circumstance when the FBI failed to comply since May 30, ; of the 27 percent of surveyed Criminal Division Chiefs who stated that confidential informants had been named in electronic surveillance affidavits in their field offices since May 30, , 88 percent told us that U.
Attorneys' Offices have been notified in all appropriate cases; only 1 Criminal Division Chief cited as a serious concern the FBI's failure to notify the appropriate federal prosecutor of unauthorized illegal activity by confidential informants and failure to share information with the U. Attorney's Office about confidential informants' activities in investigations in which the U.
Attorney's Office is participating; and as a group, the Criminal Division Chiefs did not express concerns about receiving timely notice of unauthorized illegal activity by CIs operated in their Districts since May 30, However, 35 percent stated that the impact of unauthorized illegal activity by CIs has been either a minor or occasional concern since May 30, , while 25 percent reported that notice deficiencies have been either a minor or occasional concern.
In addition, 10 percent of the surveyed Criminal Division Chiefs said they believed that FBI agents in their District do not have the same understanding as the U. Attorney's Office of the Guidelines' requirement to notify the U. Attorney of any unauthorized illegal activity by CIs. These results were one of the several areas in which the Criminal Division Chiefs indicated that the required interaction between FBI and DOJ personnel on informant matters is working well.
However, some of our findings and the results of our file reviews are in conflict with the Criminal Division Chiefs' positive assessment. As discussed above, in the course of our file reviews we identified Guidelines violations with respect to the required notifications regarding otherwise illegal activity, unauthorized illegal activity, and events surrounding the deactivation of confidential informants.
We also identified two cases in which the FBI failed to obtain proper authorization from the U. Moreover, the Criminal Division Chiefs indicated that they believe additional training for FBI Special Agents and supervisors and other measures are needed to promote adherence to the Confidential Informant Guidelines.
The following table describes the type of additional training they think is needed. Human sources are critical to the success of the FBI's criminal investigative mission and of other law enforcement and intelligence efforts aligned with that mission, including the efforts to prevent terrorism and address other emerging national security threats. Our review focused on the FBI's implementation of Attorney General Guidelines for one category of human sources, confidential informants.
The authorities and activities of other human sources, including assets and cooperating witnesses, are governed by different Attorney General Guidelines. Nor did our review examine how the FBI coordinates all of its human sources who, since November 5, , have operated under the FBI's unified Directorate of Intelligence.
Some senior FBI officials and many field personnel we interviewed believe the revisions were an overreaction and that the resulting Guidelines have generated widespread resentment among field personnel. Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition by FBI personnel we interviewed that criminal informants are vital to the success of the FBI's criminal investigative mission, and that the challenge for the government is to appropriately weigh the informant's value against the risk that the informant will commit unauthorized crimes or otherwise prejudice the government, and to monitor and supervise the relationship closely.
FBI personnel ranging from new agents to the Director told us that agents find the paperwork associated with opening and operating informants to be excessively burdensome and time-consuming. In addition, personnel in HIU stated that the current version of the Confidential Informant Guidelines is phrased in dense "legalese" that is hard for case agents to absorb, remember, and follow. Although we were unable to quantify the precise impact of these issues, some of the field and Headquarters personnel we interviewed told us that some FBI agents are now reluctant to open informants because of these and other administrative and operational burdens.
Our survey of Confidential Informant Coordinators revealed that the burden on case agents to complete the paperwork associated with the Criminal Informant Program is a major concern.
Approximately 70 percent of the Coordinators reported that case agents fail to devote adequate time to completing their paperwork or resist doing so. In addition, as the following diagram illustrates, the paperwork burdens of operating informants is one of the most frequently raised issues in their field offices.
The view that the paperwork requirements associated with handling informants excessively burden field agents was also cited in our interviews of FBI Headquarters personnel from the Criminal Investigative Division, Counterterrorism Division, Office of Intelligence, and Inspections Division. FBI Director Mueller told us that he frequently hears agents complain about the "burdensome" procedures for opening and operating informants.
In contrast, 10 of the 12 SACs in the field offices we visited said they believe the CI Guidelines are workable as written. They keep agents on track. Because of the Bureau's past fiascos, we need controls. Sometimes agents get sidetracked. He stated that his informant program personnel complete the necessary documentation for the agents if asked and were prepared to answer any questions regarding the operation of informants.
He characterized his agents as being "spoon-fed" on informant compliance issues. Notwithstanding the support available to agents in this field office, our review found that percent of the informant files we reviewed in that office contained one or more Guidelines violations. In the course of reviewing informant files in 12 field offices, we were mindful of these concerns and sought to examine whether the reason for the complaints is the Guidelines themselves; other reasons that make compliance overly complex, time-consuming, and difficult; or a combination of these factors.
After evaluating the requirements of the Confidential Informant Guidelines and how they work in the field, we share the view of the majority of SACs we interviewed that the Guidelines themselves are not overly burdensome. Instead, we believe that the significant reasons for non-compliance are: inadequate administrative support for the Criminal Informant Program, including the failure to provide standardized forms, a field guide, and Intranet tools; failure by executive managers to hold first-line supervisors accountable for compliance deficiencies and to exercise effective oversight of agents operating confidential informants; inadequate training at every level new agents, probationary agents, experienced agents, Confidential Informant Coordinators, Supervisory Special Agents, senior field managers, and key Headquarters personnel , including periodic training on the Guidelines themselves and joint training with the U.
Attorneys' Offices on appropriate methods to operate confidential informants; inadequate support of Confidential Informant Coordinators and assignment of this responsibility as a collateral duty; failure to take compliance performance into account in personnel and promotion decisions and policies; and lingering differences between the FBI and DOJ over informant issues. Below we address each of these issues.
Inadequate Administrative Support. As has been well documented, the FBI has struggled to upgrade its antiquated computer systems for many years. Our interviews, field office site visits, and analysis of documents produced by the FBI reveal that three years after the May revised Investigative Guidelines were issued, FBI agents do not have FBI-wide, standardized forms to support the administrative steps required to operate confidential informants.
The FBI is capable of producing such forms; indeed, there is widespread use of automated forms throughout the FBI to support a host of administrative and operational programs. Some of these forms are out of date and some are under-inclusive or over-inclusive in what they require.
Because of the different practices used by the FBI's field divisions to administer the Criminal Informant Program, transferred agents must make needless, time-consuming adjustments to the unique, sometimes outdated, requirements of their new offices.
The following table illustrates the wide discrepancies in data pertaining to Confidential Informant Guidelines' requirements that is collected in various forms maintained in 7 of the 12 field offices we visited. Complicating the agent's task even further is the fact that there is no one place on the FBI's Intranet where an agent who wants to initiate the registration of an informant can look for guidance regarding the approval and operation of CIs.
Consequently, it is easy to understand the frustration expressed by field office personnel in explaining compliance deficiencies when it is so difficult for agents to find the various requirements, and standardized administrative tools are not available.
Another impediment to compliance with the Guidelines is the absence of a field manual comparable to the one provided for undercover operations by the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit USOU , which we discuss in Chapter Four. Several field offices, including Newark and Knoxville, have generated their own handbooks or manuals to fill this void.
However, the best practices and time-saving devices that have evolved over the years in the field have not led to the development of a uniform field guide for all agents. Some analysts have instituted tickler systems and other mechanisms to promote timely compliance. While this support is helpful, we believe the FBI needs an agency-wide, standardized system which can be accessed at Headquarters and in the field.
Because its internal human source policies, practices, and manuals must account for and comply with the Attorney General's Guidelines, the FBI enlisted DOJ to assist in the re-engineering effort. The working group's goals are to develop new guidelines, policies, and processes for the utilization of confidential human sources that are designed to reduce burdensome paperwork, standardize source administration procedures, clarify compliance requirements, and improve Guidelines compliance.
Headquarters officials, field managers, Informant Coordinators, and Division Counsel we interviewed identified the first-level supervisor as the linchpin to ensuring FBI agents are held accountable for compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines.
Our review indicated, however, that some field supervisors have failed to identify risks associated with operating informants. For example, Supervisory Special Agents SSAs are required every 90 days to conduct reviews of all confidential informant files, or, in the case of privileged informants, every 60 days.
During this review, they are to note a variety of information, including Guidelines compliance deficiencies pertaining to payments, criminal history checks, authority to engage in otherwise illegal activity, and continuing suitability. We saw many instances where file reviews were not performed timely and deficiencies were not resolved promptly. See also Chapter 7, Case Study 7. Beyond the general issue of timely compliance with the Guidelines, we believe, based on our field and Headquarters interviews and survey responses, that some field supervisors have historically failed to be as fully engaged as needed to identify risks associated with operating informants.
Our findings with respect to supervisory approval and monitoring of "otherwise illegal activity" and notifications regarding the occurrence of unauthorized illegal activity are particularly notable in this regard.
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